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Abstract
Multi-party interactions in Web Service composition are hardly managed where
parallel communications, while end-to-end security is respected, is difficult to
be designed and verified. In this paper, we present an approach to handle and
secure multi-party interactions in Web Service (WS) composition. A key ingre-
dient of this methodology is to present the system composition at an abstract
level as a component-based model where we verify and configure it securely.
Then, we transform the model to generate secure orchestrator components that
handle multi-party interactions. Afterwards, we generate accordingly BPEL
processes where the security constrains are enforced as security WS-policies in
the BPEL description of services. The framework we present is robust since
founded on formal proves of the security properties. We validate this approach
by securing a social network application called Whens App.
Key words: web service orchestration, BPEL, component-based systems,
information flow security, non-interference, secure-by-construction, automated
verification.
1. Introduction
With the expansion of Web Services (WS) [1] deployed on the enterprise
servers, cloud infrastructures and mobile devices, Web Service composition is
currently a widely used technique to build complex Internet and enterprise ap-
plications. Orchestration languages, like WS-BPEL [2], allow rapidly develop-
ing composed WS by defining a set of activities binding sophisticated services.
However, multi-party interactions involving several participants are relatively
✩This article extends the article [14] published at the ISoLA 2016 conference.The research
leading to these results has received funding from the European Community’s Seventh Frame-
work Programme [FP7/2007-2013] under grant agreement ICT-318772 (D-MILS).
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less explored in actual standards such as WS-BPEL [3] and WS-CDL [4], espe-
cially for e-Business and Business-to-nBusiness (B2B) application integration.
In several cases, responses might be time-critical and all suppliers might be
required to receive the request and respond within a specified duration. The
preparation of requests, the sending of requests and the receipt of responses
might need coordination to concurrently execute a specific atomic tasks .
Additionally, within such functionality requirements, security-related prob-
lems and difficulties are raised where advanced skills and tools are required to
ensure critical information security between different parties. Indeed, ensur-
ing the communication security between parties who do not trust each other
and where they must exchange messages in a synchronized and simultaneous
way, is a tedious and very difficult task. It is important to track information
flow and prevent illicit accesses by unauthorized services and networks; this
task can be challenging when the service is complex or when the composition
is hierarchical (the service is composition of composed services and atomic ser-
vices). WS-security standards [5, 6] provide information flow security solutions
for point-to-point inter-service communications but fall short in ensuring end-
to-end information flow security in composed services. Furthermore, the BPEL
language does not state any rules on how to properly secure service composi-
tions.
In many situations, security is reduced to access control to prevent sensitive
information from being read or modified by unauthorized users. However, access
control is insufficient to regulate the propagation of information once released
for processing by a program especially with non-trivial interactions and compu-
tations. Thus access control offers no guarantees about whether an information
is subsequently protected. Deciding how to set access control permissions in
complex systems is a difficult problem in itself. Equally, using cryptographic
primitives that provides strong confidentiality and integrity guarantees, is also
less helpful to ensure that the system obeys an overall security policy.
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Figure 1: Secure work-flow for secure orchestrating multi-party interactions in WS composi-
tion.
In this paper, we propose a robust framework ensuring end-to-end informa-
tion flow security while orchestrating WS. Figure 1 shows a work-flow overview
of this framework. The service designer describes the behavior of his processes
and defines security constraints. The constraints are expressed as authorization
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rights, that is, a list of services owners and authorized readers for a subset of
critical data. The WS processes can be expressed in different languages such as
BPEL or Java (BPEL in our case) from which we extract their behavior into
atomic components. Over these extracted components, we manually define and
add a set of interactions considering user expectation.
The abstraction aim to verify an end-to-end information flow security on
the system composition. Information flow security has been traditionally stud-
ied separately for language-based models [7, 8] (see also the survey [9]) and
trace-based models [10, 11, 12, 13]. While the former mostly focus on veri-
fication of data-flow security properties in programming languages, the latter
is treating security in event-based systems. In this work, we achieve a useful
combination between both aspects, data-flow and event-flow security, in a sin-
gle semantics model. In email exchange two types of information disclosure
are possible: either by observing the email message content or by simply he
observing email exchange occurrence, dates and frequency. we can collect in-
formation about a relation between two entities in a system by just observing
events related to emails sending and receiving, while accessing the content of the
emails would represent a collection of data exchanged between them. Therefore,
we introduce and distinguish two types of non-interference, respectively event
non-interference and data non-interference. For events, non-interference states
that the observation of public events should not allow to deduce any informa-
tion about the occurrence of secret events. For data, it states that there is no
leakage of secret data into public ones.
Once our security properties are verified, we apply a correct-by-construction
transformation that generates orchestrator components (services) that handle
and manage the interactions execution in a decentralized way where the security
constraints are preserved and based on which we generate an executable BPEL
code. This approach is beneficial, as one can first ensure system requirements by
dealing with a high-level formally specified model that abstracts implementation
details and then derive a correct implementation through a series of transfor-
mations that terminates when an actual executable code is obtained.
This paper is an extension of [14] to automatically orchestrate Web services
with secure multi-party interactions. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
formal analysis on orchestrating and securing multi-party interactions in web
services. Compared with the existing work, our contributions are the following:
• This method rely on a representation through an abstract high-level model
allowing to run non-interference verification, then a transformation to-
wards fully distributed model that is secure-by-construction. This ap-
proach is applied on composing WS and generating BPEL orchestrator’s
handling secure multi-party interactions.
• A distinction between two types of non-interference allowing to ensure
security of both event and data while generating orchestrator components.
In this approach, we ensure a security level-based isolation while handling
interactions, and we exchange data from different security levels in a more
permissive way between different orchestrator components.
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• A tool-set implementation to generate BPEL orchestrator components and
an evaluation of our approach through real case-study.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3 presents the functional and
security aspects of the adopted component-based framework. In Section 4, we
present a correct-by-construction transformation approach to orchestrate WS
compositions. Section 5 presents the implementation tool-set and we report
experiments and discussion. Finally, Section 6 discusses the related work and
Section 7 concludes and presents some lines for future work.
2. Running Example
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Figure 2: Overview of Whens App application.
Throughout the paper, we consider a simplified social network application,
called Whens App that contains essentially two WS, Event-Receiver (ER) and
Event-Creator (EC). The application is intended for organizing virtual multi-
party events between ER and EC where participants can meet and exchange
data as illustrated in Figure 2.
As social network application, Whens App entails several security require-
ments. In this paper we focus on requirements related to information flow secu-
rity: assuming that components are trustful and the network is insecure, (1) the
interception and observation of exchanged data messages must not reveal any
information about event organization and (2) confidentiality of classified data
is always preserved and kept secret inter- and intra-components. We will show
that both requirements are ensured by using security annotations for tracking
events and data in the system. Then, we show how the annotated model can
be automatically and systematically transformed towards a distributed imple-
mentation while preserving the security properties.
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As previously mentioned, the input services can be defined in different pro-
gramming languages (Java, WSDL, BPEL, ...), mainly, we simulate and present
the behavior of the input processes in a component based models. In our partic-
ular case, we consider the BPEL language that we present in component model
following transformation from [15].
3. Secure Component-Based Model
Systems are constructed from atomic components, that is, finite state au-
tomata or 1-safe Petri nets, extended with data and ports. Communication
between components is achieved using multi-party interactions with data trans-
fer.
Definition 1 (atomic component). We present synchronous components and
their semantics. The behavior of a synchronous component within a synchronous
computation step is a 1-safe extended Petri net with given sets of initial and fi-
nal places. When only final places are marked, termination may terminate by
removing tokens from final places and putting tokens to initial places.
An atomic component B is a tuple (L, X,P , T ) where X is a set of variables
and N = (L, P , T ) is an extended 1-safe Petri net. L is a finite set of places, P
is a set of ports and T ⊆ 2L ×P × 2L is a finite set of transitions. A transition
τ is a triple (•τ, a, τ•) where •τ is the input place of τ and the τ• is the output
place of τ . A transition is labelled by a port p and (gτ , fτ ) where gτ is the guard
of τ , that is a predicate on X and fτ is the update function associated with τ ,
that is a state transformer defined on X.
Let D be a universal data domain, fixed. A valuation of a set of variables Y
is a function y : Y → D. We denote by Y the set of all valuations defined on Y .
The semantics of an atomic component B is defined as the labelled transition
system sem(B) = (QB , PB ,−→
B
) where the set of states QB = M×X (where
M = {m : L→ {0, 1}} is the set of 1-safe markings), the set of labels ΣB = P
and transitions −→
B
are defined by the rules:
Atom
τ = ℓ
p
−→ ℓ′ ∈ T x′′p ∈ Xp gτ (x) x
′ = fτ (x[Xp ← x
′′
p ])
(ℓ,x)
p(x′′p )
−−−−→
B
(ℓ′,x′)
That is, (ℓ′,x′) is a successor of (ℓ,x) labelled by p(x′′p) iff (1) τ = ℓ
p
−→ ℓ′ is
a transition of T , (2) the guard gτ holds on the current state valuation x, (3)
x′′p is a valuation of exported variables Xp and (4) x
′ = fτ (x[Xp ← x
′′
p ]) that is,
the next-state valuation x′ is obtained by applying fτ on x previously modified
according to x′′p . Whenever a p-labelled successor exists in a state, we say that
p is enabled in that state.
In our model, atomic components have exclusive access on their variables.
Interactions between components take place only through explicit input/output
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connectors. A connector defines a static communication channel from one out-
put port pout of a sender component Bi to a set of input ports p
{in}
j in receiver
components {Bj}j=1..n where i 6= j. The connector is denoted by the tuple
(pout,pini ,. . . , p
in
n ). Intuitively, when communication takes place, the value of
var(pout) is assigned to var(pin).
s:=f(y)
c3
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c1
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invite
x
r1
r2
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receive
enter
report
store
s
y push
get r
cancel
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get pushreport
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Figure 3: Example of atomic components
Figure 3 presents the atomic components used in the Whens App application
model. The Event Creator (left) coordinates an event lifetime (invite, open and
cancel transitions), get raw information from participants (store) and delivers
some information digests (report). The Event Receiver (right) enters an event
(receive, enter), share information (push) and receive event digests (get). [Colors
are explained later]
Composite components are obtained by composing atomic components Bi =
(Li, Xi, Pi, Ti)i=1,n through multi-party interactions. We consider that atomic
components have pairwise disjoint sets of locations, ports, and variables i.e., for
any two i 6= j from {1..n}, we have Li ∩ Lj = ∅, Pi ∩ Pj = ∅, and Xi ∩Xj = ∅.
A multi-party interaction a is a triple (Pa, Ga, Fa), where Pa ⊆
⋃n
i=1 Pi is a
set of ports, Ga is a guard, and Fa is a data transfer function. By definition, Pa
uses at most one port of every component, that is, |Pi∩Pa| ≤ 1 for all i ∈ {1..n}.
Therefore, we simply denote Pa = {pi}i∈I , where I ⊆ {1..n} contains the indices
of the components involved in a and for all i ∈ I, pi ∈ Pi. Ga and Fa are both
defined on the variables exported by the ports in Pa (i.e.,
⋃
p∈Pa
Xp).
Let {Bi = (Li, Xi, Pi, Ti)}i=1,n be a set of synchronous components defined
on disjoint sets of variables and ports. Let γ be a set of interactions on ports
∪ni=1Pi such that each interaction uses at most one port of every component,
that is for all a ∈ γ, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, |Pa ∩ Pi| ≤ 1. The composition
γ(B1, . . . , Bn) is a partial operation defining the synchronous component B =
(X,P,N) where:
Definition 2 (composite component). A composite component C = γ(B1, . . . , Bn)
is obtained by applying a set of interactions γ to a set of atomic components
B1, . . . Bn.
Let B = γ(B1, . . . , Bn) be a composite component. Let Bi = (Li, Pi, Ti, Xi)
and sem(Bi) = (Qi,Σi,−−→
Bi
) their semantics, for all i = 1, n. The semantics
of C is the labelled transition system sem(C) = (QC ,ΣC ,−→
C
) where the set of
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states QC = ⊗
n
i=1Qi, the set of labels ΣC = γ and the set of labelled transitions
−→
C
is defined by the rule:
Comp
a = ({pi}i∈I , Ga, Fa) ∈ γ Ga({xpi}i∈I) {x
′′
pi
}i∈I = Fa({xpi}i∈I)
∀i ∈ I. (ℓi,xi)
pi(x
′′
pi
)
−−−−−→
Bi
(ℓ′i,x
′
i) ∀i 6∈ I. (ℓi,xi) = (ℓ
′
i,x
′
i)
((ℓ1,x1), . . . , (ℓn,xn))
a
−→
C
((ℓ′1,x
′
1), . . . , (ℓ
′
n,x
′
n))
For each i ∈ I, xpi above denotes the valuation xi restricted to variables of
Xpi . The rule expresses that a composite component C = γ(B1, . . . , Bn)
can execute an interaction a ∈ γ enabled in state ((ℓ1,x1), . . . , (ℓn,xn)), iff
(1) for each pi ∈ Pa, the corresponding atomic component Bi can execute a
transition labelled by pi, and (2) the guard Ga of the interaction holds on the
current valuation of variables exported on ports participating in a. Execution
of interaction a triggers first the update function Fa which modifies variables
exported by ports pi ∈ Pa. The new values obtained, encoded in the valuation
x′′pi , are then used by the components’ transitions. The states of components
that do not participate in the interaction remain unchanged.
Any finite sequences of interactions w = a1...ak ∈ γ
∗ executable by the
composite component starting at some given initial state q0 is named a trace.
The set of all traces w from state q0 is denoted by traces(C, q0).
We call a trace any finite sequence of interactions w = a1a2 · · · ∈ γ
∗ exe-
cutable from a given initial state q0. The set of all traces w from state q0 is
denoted by traces(C, q0).
EC12
store report
x x
y:=x
y:=x
y:=x
invite
open
invite
open
enter enterenter
EC23
receive receive receive
s s
r rr
r:=s
r:=s r:=s
r:=s
store report
push get push get push get
x
y:=x
y y
ER1 ER2 ER3
Figure 4: Example of composite component
Figure 4 presents a simplified composite component for an instance of the
Whens App application with two event creators and three event receivers. In-
teractions are represented using connecting lines between the interacting ports.
Binary interactions (push store) and (report get) include data transfers between
components, that is, assignments of data across interacting components.
3.1. Information Flow Security
We consider transitive information flow policies expressed on system vari-
ables and we focus on the non-interference properties. We restrict ourselves to
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confidentiality and we ensure that no illegal flow of information exists between
variables having incompatible security levels.
Formally, we represent security domains as finite lattices 〈S,⊑〉 where S
denotes the security levels and ⊑ the flows to relation. For example, a security
domain with two levels High (H), Low (L) and where information is allowed to
flow from Low to High is 〈{L,H}, {(L,L), (L,H), (H,H)}〉. For clarity sake of
the paper, we will use H and L levels to present our approach to handle security.
Let C = γ(B1, . . . Bn) be a composite component, fixed. Let X (resp. P ) be
the set of all variables (resp. ports) defined in all atomic components (Bi)i=1,n.
Let 〈S,⊑〉 be a security domain, fixed.
Definition 3 (security assignment σ). A security assignment for component
C is a mapping σ : X ∪ P ∪ γ → S that associates security levels to variables,
ports and interactions such that, moreover, the levels of ports and interactions
match, that is, for all a ∈ γ and for all p ∈ P it holds σ(p) = σ(a).
The security levels for ports and variables track the flow of information along
computation steps within atomic components. The security levels for interac-
tions track the flow of information along inter-component communication. We
consider that deducing event-related information represent a risk that should
be handled while controlling the system’s information flow in addition to data
flows. End-to-end security is defined according to transitive non-interference.
Let σ be a security assignment for C, fixed. For a security level s ∈ S,
we define γ ↓σs the restriction of γ to interactions with security level at most
s that is formally, γ ↓σs= {a ∈ γ | σ(a) ⊑ s}. For a security level s ∈ S,
we define w|σs the projection of a trace w ∈ γ
∗ to interactions with security
level lower or equal to s. Formally, the projection is recursively defined on
traces as ǫ|σs = ǫ, (aw)|
σ
s = a(w|
σ
s ) if σ(a) ⊑ s and (aw)|
σ
s = w|
σ
s if σ(a) 6⊑ s.
The projection operator |σs is naturally lifted to sets of traces W by taking
W |σs = {w|
σ
s | w ∈W}.
For a security level s ∈ S, we define the equivalence ≈σs on states of C.
Two states q1, q2 are equivalent, denoted by q1 ≈
σ
s q2 iff (1) they coincide on
variables having security levels at most s and (2) they coincide on control states
having outgoing transitions labeled with ports with security level at most s.
We are now ready to define the two types of non-interference respectively event
non-interference (ENI) and data non-interference (DNI).
Definition 4 (event/data non-interference). The security assignment σ en-
sures event (ENI) and data non-interference (DNI) of γ(B1, . . . , Bn) at security
level s iff,
(ENI) ∀q0 ∈ Q
0
C : traces(γ(B1, . . . , Bn), q0)|
σ
s =
traces((γ ↓σs )(B1, . . . , Bn), q0)
(DNI) ∀q1, q2 ∈ Q
0
C : q1 ≈
σ
s q2 ⇒
∀w1 ∈ traces(C, q1), w2 ∈ traces(C, q2) : w1|
σ
s = w2|
σ
s ⇒
∀q′1, q
′
2 ∈ QC : q1
w1−−→
C
q′1 ∧ q2
w2−−→
C
q′2 ⇒ q
′
1 ≈
σ
s q
′
2
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Moreover, σ is said secure for a component γ(B1, . . . , Bn) iff it ensures both
event and data non-interference, at all security levels s ∈ S.
Both variants of non-interference express some form of indistinguishability
between several states and traces of the system. For instance, an attacker that
can observe the system’s variables and occurrences of interactions at security
level s1 must not be able to distinguish neither changes on variables or occur-
rence of interactions having higher or incomparable security level s2.
The running example presented in Figures 3 and 4 is annotated with two
levels of security Low (in black) and High (in red). With this assignment,
the exchange of information during the event and some related data are High
whereas the event initiation is Low.
3.2. Noninterference Checking
In our previous work [16], we established sufficient syntactic conditions that
reduce the verification of non-interference to local constrains checking on tran-
sitions (intra-component) and interactions (inter-components). We recall these
conditions hereafter as they are going to be used later in section 4 for establish-
ing security correctness of the decentralized component model. Indeed, these
conditions offer a syntactic way to ensure both event and data non-interference
and therefore to obtain preservation proofs for along decentralization.
Definition 5 (security conditions). Let C = γ(B1, . . . , Bn) be a composite
component and let σ be a security assignment. We say that C satisfies the
security conditions for security assignment σ iff:
(i) the security assignment of ports, in every atomic component Bi is locally
consistent, that is, for every pair of causal transitions:
∀τ1, τ2 ∈ Ti : τ1 = ℓ1
p1
−→ ℓ2, τ2 = ℓ2
p2
−→ ℓ3 ⇒ (ℓ1 6= ℓ2 ⇒ σ(p1) ⊑ σ(p2))
and for every pair of conflicting transitions:
∀τ1, τ2 ∈ Ti : τ1 = ℓ1
p1
−→ ℓ2, τ2 = ℓ1
p2
−→ ℓ3 ⇒ σ(p1) = σ(p2)
(ii) all assignments x := e occurring in transitions within atomic components
and interactions are sequential consistent, in the classical sense:
∀y ∈ use(e) : σ(y) ⊑ σ(x)
(iii) variables are consistently used and assigned in transitions and interactions:
∀τ ∈ ∪ni=1Ti, ∀x, y ∈ X : x ∈ def(fτ ), y ∈ use(gτ )⇒ σ(y) ⊑ σ(pτ ) ⊑ σ(x)
∀a ∈ γ, ∀x, y ∈ X : x ∈ def(Fa), y ∈ use(Ga)⇒ σ(y) ⊑ σ(a) ⊑ σ(x)
(iv) all atomic components Bi are port deterministic:
∀τ1, τ2 ∈ Ti : τ1 = ℓ1
p
−→ ℓ2, τ2 = ℓ1
p
−→ ℓ3 ⇒ (gτ1 ∧ gτ2) is unsatisfiable
The first family of conditions (i) is similar to Accorsi’s conditions [17] for
excluding causal and conflicting places for Petri net transitions having different
security levels. Similar conditions have been considered in [18, 19] and lead to
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more specific definitions of non-interferences and bi-simulations on annotated
Petri nets. The second condition (ii) represents the classical condition needed
to avoid information leakage in sequential assignments. The third condition
(iii) tackles covert channels issues. Indeed, (iii) enforces the security levels of
the data flows which have to be consistent with security levels of the ports or
interactions (e.g., no low level data has to be updated on a high level port or
interaction). Such that, observations of public data would not reveal any secret
information. Finally, condition (iv) enforces deterministic behavior on atomic
components.
The following result, proven in [16], states that the security conditions are
sufficient to ensure both event and data non-interference.
Theorem 1. Whenever the security conditions hold, the security assignment σ
is secure for the composite component C.
For example, the security conditions hold for the security assignment consid-
ered for the running example in Figures 3 and 4. Notice that local consistency
is ensured in both atomic components: the security level can only increase from
Low to High along causal transitions and no choices exist between Low and High
transitions. Equally, notice that no High data is assigned on Low interactions.
4. Automated Generation of Secure Orchestrators
In this section, we describe an automated way to generate orchestrator com-
ponents that enforces the information flow security in the BPEL processes
compositions while handling the interaction executions.
This generation introduces (1) a transformation on atomic components be-
havior where we introduce Send/Receive message passing and (2) using adaptors
to handle the execution of interactions. Whenever a component needs to inter-
act, it publishes an offer, that is the list of its enabled ports, then wait for a
notification from the orchestrator indicating which interaction has been chosen,
and then resume its execution. From his side, every orchestrator component
handles a subset of interactions, that is, checks them for enabledness and sched-
ule them for execution accordingly. The interface between components and
orchestrator provides ports for receiving offers and notifying the ports selected
for execution.
Using this decentralization approach, the preservation of information flow se-
curity in the system composition is achieved by imposing few restrictions on the
structure of the orchestrator components and providing additional communica-
tion ports at atomic component level to exchange messages and data security
between them. We show that the security assignment from the original model
is naturally lifted to the decentralized model and consequently, non-interference
is preserved along the transformation.
Let C = γ(B1, · · · , Bn) be a composite component and σ be a secure assign-
ment for C which satisfies the security conditions for non-interference.
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4.1. Atomic Components
The transformation of atomic components consists in breaking atomicity of
transitions. Precisely, each transition is split into two consecutive steps: (1)
an offer that publishes the current state of the component, and (2) a notifi-
cation that triggers an update function and resume local computation. The
intuition behind this transformation is that the offer transition correspond to
sending information about component’s intention to interact with the orches-
trator component and the notification transition corresponds to receiving the
answer from the orchestrator, once an interaction has been completed. Update
functions can be then executed concurrently and independently by components
upon notification reception.
To protect information flow, distinct offer ports os and interaction counters
ns are introduced for every security level defined initially at centralized atomic
components. Thus, offers and corresponding notifications have the same security
level, and moreover, no information about execution of interactions is revealed
through the observation of interaction counters.
Definition 6 (transformed atomic component). Let B = (L,X, P, T ) be
an atomic component within C. The corresponding transformed S/R component
is BSR = (LSR, XSR, PSR, TSR):
• LSR = L ∪ L⊥, where L⊥ = {⊥ℓ | ℓ ∈ L}
• XSR = X ∪ {ep}p∈P ∪ {ns|s ∈ S} where ep is a fresh boolean variable
indicating whether port p is enabled, and ns is a fresh integer variable
called interaction counter for security level s.
• PSR = P ∪ {os | s ∈ S}. The offer ports os export the variables Xos =
{ns}
⋃
{{ep}∪Xp | σ(p) = s} that is the interaction counter ns, the newly
added variable ep and the variables Xp associated to ports p with security
level s. For other ports, the set of variables exported remains unchanged.
• For each state ℓ ∈ L, let Sℓ be the set of security levels assigned to ports
labeling all outgoing transitions of ℓ. For each security level s ∈ Sℓ, we
include the offer transition τos = (⊥ℓ
os−→ ℓ) ∈ TSR, where the guard gos is
true and fos resets variables ep to false, for all ports p with security level
s.
• For each transition τ = ℓ
p
−→ ℓ′ ∈ T we include a notification transition
τp = (ℓ
p
−→ ⊥ℓ′) where the guard gp is true and the function fp applies the
original update function fτ on X, sets er variables to gτr for every port
r ∈ P such that τr = ℓ
′ r−→ ℓ′′ ∈ T and increments ns.
We introduce now the extended security assignment for transformed atomic
components BSR. Intuitively, all existing variables and ports from B keep their
original security level, whereas the newly introduced ones are assigned such that
to preserve the security conditions of the transformed component.
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Figure 5: Transformation of atomic components illustrated on the Event Receiver
Definition 7 (security assignment σSR for BSR). The security assignment
σSR is the extension of the original security assignment σ to variables XSR and
ports PSR from BSR as follows:
σ
SR(x) =





σ(p) if x = ep and p ∈ P
s if x = ns and s ∈ S
σ(x) otherwise, for x ∈ XSR
σ
SR(p) =
{
s if p = os and s ∈ S
σ(p) otherwise, for p ∈ PSR
As example, the component transformation and the extended security assign-
ment for the Event Receiver are depicted in Figure 5. Variables nL, einvite, eopen
and the offer port oL are assigned to Low. Variables nH , epush, eget and the port
oH are assigned to High. Ones can check that this assignment obeys all the
(local) security conditions related to BSR.
Actually, security conditions are preserved along the proposed transforma-
tion of atomic components with respect to extended security assignment. The
following lemma formalizes this result.
Lemma 1. BSR satisfies the security conditions with security assignment σSR.
Proof 1. easy check, security conditions hold by definition of BSR and σSR.
4.2. Secure Orchestrator Generation
Orchestrator consists of a set of components, each in charge of the execution
of a subset of interactions from the original component model. Every such
orchestrator component is a controller that, iteratively, receives offers from the
transformed atomic components, computes enabled interactions and schedule
them for execution.
In this paper, we consider orchestrator components handling a conflict-free
partitioning of interactions, as in [20]. Two interactions a1 and a2 are in conflict
iff either (i) they share a common port p (i.e p ∈ a1 ∩ a2) or (ii) there exist two
conflicting transitions at a local state ℓ of a component Bi that are labeled with
ports p1 and p2, where p1 ∈ a1 and p2 ∈ a2. Conflict-free partitioning allows
orchestrator to run fully independently of each other, that is, local decisions
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taken on every orchestrator component about executing one of its interactions
do not interfere with others.
Moreover, in order to ensure information flow security, we impose an addi-
tional restriction on interaction partitioning, that is, the subset of interactions
handled within every orchestrator component must have the same security level.
Intuitively, this restriction allows us to enforce by construction the security con-
ditions for all orchestrator and later, for the system composition.
Bearing this in mind, let us observe that if the original system satisfies the se-
curity conditions then the partitioning of interactions according to their security
level is conflict-free. That is, no conflict exists between interactions with differ-
ent security levels - this simply follows from the condition (i) on the labeling of
conflicting transitions. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity of presentation, we
restrict hereafter our construction to the partitioning according to security lev-
els. For every security level s we consider one orchestrator component, (Orchs),
handling the subset of interactions γs = {a ∈ γ | σ(a) = s} with security level
s.
Definition 8 (Orchestrator component at level s (Orchs)). The compo-
nent Orchs = (L
O, XO, PO, TO) handling γs is defined as:
• Set of places LO is the union of waiting places {{wi} | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}
and receive places {{ri} | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} for all Bi ∈ participants(γs) and
sending places {sp | p ∈ ports(γs)}.
• Set of variables XO is the union of notification variables {{nis | i ∈
{1, . . . , n}} for every security level s defined in every component Bi ∈
participants(γs)}} and the variables by the offer port {{xp} ∪ Xp | p ∈
ports(γs)}
• Set of ports PO = {{osi} | i = {1, . . . , n}} ∪ {p | p ∈ ports(γs)} where offer
ports ois are associated to variables nis, xp, and Xp from all component
Bi ∈ participants(γs) and ports p are associated to variables Xp.
• Set of transitions TO ⊆ 2L
O
× PO × 2L
O
. A transition τ is a triple
(•τ, p, τ•), where •τ is the set of input places of τ and τ• is the set of
output places of τ . We introduce three types of transitions:
– receiving offers (wi, osi, ri) for all components Bi ∈ participants(γs).
– executing interaction ({ri}i∈I2 , a, {spi}i∈I2) for each interaction a ∈
γs such that a = {pi}i∈I2 , where I2 is the set of components involved
in a. To this transition we associate the guard [Ga ∧
∧
p∈a xp] and
we apply the original update function Fa on ∪p∈aXp.
– sending notification (sp, p, wi) for all ports p and component Bi ∈
participants(γs).
Definition 9 (security assignment σSR for Orchs). The security assignment
σSR is built from the original security assignment σ. For variables XOrch and
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ports POrch of the Orchs component that handles γs, we define
σ
SR(x) =
{
σ(x) if x ∈ Xp and s ⊑ σ(x)
s otherwise
σ
SR(p) = s if p ∈ PO
The above definition enforces the security conditions for Orchs adaptors.
Lemma 2. Orchs satisfies the security conditions with security assignment
σSR.
Proof 2. Trivial check for conditions (i, iv). The condition (ii) on sequential
consistency is also valid, even if some (replicated) variables within Orchs are
upgraded to level s. On one hand, these variables, if any, were exclusively used
(e.g., within guards, or left-hand sides of assignments) and never defined in
interactions from γs. On the other hand, all defined variables have the security
level greater than s. Same reasoning applies for the condition (iii) with respect
to ports.
enter1invite1
L L L L L L LL L
invite2 open enter2invite
[eenter1 eenter2 ∧∧
wec
oer2oecoer1
srconf1
wer1
OrchL
wer1
wer2wec wec
srconf2
wer2
[einvite1 einvite2∧∧
einvite]
rer1
rec rer2
wer1 wer2
oer2 oecopenenter2enter1oer1invite1invite invite2
srreq1 screq srreq2
scconf
eenter ]
Figure 6: Generated orchestrator component OrchL for a simplified Whens App system com-
posed of two Event Receivers and one Event Creator
The extended security assignment σSR for Orchs variables and ports is de-
fined as follows. All ports are annotated with security level s. Regarding vari-
ables, σSR maintains the same security level for all variables having their level
greater than s in the original model and upgrades the others to s. That is,
all variables within the Orchs component will have security level at least s.
This change is mandatory to ensure consistent transfer of data in offers (resp.
notifications) between atomic components and Orchs.
4.3. System Composition
As a final step, the decentralized model CSR is obtained as the composition
γSR(BSR1 , ..., B
SR
n , (Orchs)s∈S) involving the transformed components B
SR
i and
components Orchs. The set γ
SR contains S/R interactions and is defined as
follows:
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Figure 7: Decentralized model for the Whens App example
• for every component BSRi participating in interactions having security
level s, include in γSR the offer interaction (BSRi .os, Orchs.oi) associated
with the transfer of data from the component port os to the Orchs com-
ponent port oi.
• for every port p in component BSRi with security level s, include in γ
SR
the notification interaction (Orchs.p, Bi.p) associated with the transfer of
the subset of Xp variables having security level at least s from the Orchs
component port p to the component port p. Actually, these are the only
variables that could have been modified by an interaction having level s.
The security assignment σSR is naturally lifted from offer/notification ports
to the interactions of γSR. Intuitively, every S/R interaction involving compo-
nent Orchs has security level s. The construction is illustrated for the running
example in Figure 7. We omitted the representation of ports and depict only
the interactions and their associated data flow. In particular, consider the x
variable of Event Receiver which is upgraded to H when sent to OrchH and not
sent back on the notification of the push interaction.
The following theorem states our main result, that is, the constructed two-
layer S/R model satisfies the security conditions by construction.
Theorem 2. The decentralized component CSR = γSR(BSR1 , ..., B
SR
n , (Orchs)s∈S)
satisfies security conditions for the security assignment σSR.
Proof 3. From lemma 1 and 2 all security conditions related to transformed
components and orchestrator components are satisfied. The only remaining con-
dition (iii) concerns the assignment of data along S/R interactions. As all the
variables in Orchs have been eventually upgraded to level s, the assignment
within offer interactions is consistent. Similar for notifications at level s, their
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assignment is restricted by construction to variables having security level at least
s.
Example 1. Figure 8 (a) presents a data transfer between Event Creator and
an Event Receiver on the synchronized interaction get rep where the variable
r from component Event Receiver is assigned to the variable s in component
Event Creator if the variable active is true. The variable s, r are tagged with H
annotation and the variable active is tagged with L annotation. In the decentral-
ized model shown in Figure 8 (b), the OrchH component executes interaction
get. To this end, variables s, r are imported into the same security level of
variables s′, r′, while the variable active is imported into a higher security level
variable active′, through the corresponding offer port. Once the interaction takes
place, s′ is copied back to s on the notification transition. No copy is performed
back to the r and active variables. Here we manage different level variable in
the same Orch scheduler.
r’:=r
Event_Creator Event_Receiver
(a)
s
:r:s
r’
active
getreport
Event_Receiver
(b)
getreport:active
:r’
:s’
active
r:=s
[active=true]
r
get_rep
s’
[active’=true]
  r’:=s’
rs
:active’
:s :active :r
Event_Creator
s’:=s r:=r’
H
H L
H H
H
L HH
OrchH = {get rep}
SR SR
oecL2 oer1L2
Figure 8: Secure Data Exchange between atomic and orchestrator components.
5. Implementation
In this section, we illustrate a complete design flow for generating secure
distributed code represented in Figure 9. The implementation is based on the
use of secureBIP framework as a platform. The white strong lined boxes repre-
sent modules that we implemented while the shaded strong lined ones represent
modules that already exists and we modified to encompass security. Based on
secureBIP framework [21], we implement these modules in Java language and
we generate BPEL processes for the system composition. In this architecture,
the flow consists on configuring security at two levels, first at the abstract model
and second depending on target platform. Hereafter, we first present the trans-
formation of orchestrator components to BPEL processes and we introduce the
implement annotation model, then we present the secureBIP tool-set for differ-
ent implementation steps and design choices.
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Figure 9: Tool-set Architecture Overview.
5.1. BPEL Process for Orchestrator Components
BPEL provides structuring mechanisms several WS into a new one. We par-
ticularly focus on WS-BPEL processes which compose services from activities,
that are either (1) basic such as receive, reply, invoke, assign, throw, exist, or
(2) structured such as sequence, if, while, repeatuntil, pick, flow.
Here the transformation consists mainly on generating BPEL code for or-
chestrator component to manage the execution of system composition. Many
transformations from Petri-nets into BPEL has been given in the literature.
Our work is based on a formally verified transformation presented in detailed
mapping between WF-nets to BPEL. For more details, we refer to a techni-
cal report [22]. The transformation in the reverse direction, from BPEL to
component-based model is given in our previous work [15]. This transformation
exploits the behavior of the orchestrator component and defines the different
sequences and flows in each behavior. Clearly, the sequence allows for the most
straightforward mapping onto BPEL. From any source place to any sink place,
that are connected by different transitions each representing an activity in the
atomic component, we consider it as a switch that can be either explicit (where
condition are defined over expressions) or implicit (only with messages). A loop
on a place is transformed into a while construct.
More particularly, the behavior of an orchestrator component is generic,
presented as a set of 〈flow.../〉 depending on the number of handled interac-
tions in each component. An interaction in an Orch component can only take
place if all offers from the involved components are received. Such structure
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<receive"A"/>
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<flow> before <switch>
<assign>
(d)
Figure 10: The representation of main transitions of the orchestrator component in BPEL
language.
is transformed in a BPEL process as 〈flow.../〉 construct. As presented in Fig-
ure 10, (a) the offer transitions are transformed into 〈receive.../〉 activity and
(b)the notify transitions are translated into 〈replay.../〉 activities in the flow.
The transition representing interaction execution are transitions with multiple
input places that are translated to an internal assign activity that executes the
corresponding assignment on an interaction with a condition set to ”All” (Fig-
ure 10 (c) and (d)). The join condition states that all interacting component
should be ready to execute. Considering the example given earlier (Figure 6) of
generating an orchestrator OrchL to handle interactions from the same security
level L between two Event Receivers and one Event Creator. Figure 11 is a rep-
resentation of the OrchL component into a BPEL orchestrator process. This
process is basically a flow over a set of received offer messages that contains a
set of updated variables. According to the condition expression value, one of
the interactions is executed.
5.2. Security Labels Implementation
To track information flow in the system, we implemented the Decentralized
Label Model [23]. This model provides a universal labelling scheme where secu-
rity labels (or levels) are expressed using set of policies. A confidentiality label
L contains (1) an owner set, denoted O(L), that are principals representing the
originating sources of the information, and (2) contains for each owner o ∈ O(L)
a set of readers, denoted R(L,o), representing principals to whom the owner o
is willing to release the information. The association of an owner o and a set
of readers R(o) defines a policy. Principals are ordered using an acts for par-
tial order relation (denoted ≺) which is a delegation mechanism that enables a
principal to pass his rights to another principal (e.g., o1 ≺ o2 states that o2 can
act for o1). A security domain is defined over the set of confidentiality labels by
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<flow name="InteractionsExecutionOrch_L">
<receive partner="EventCreator" variable="e_inviteECRequest"
operation="sendOfferECRequest" container="OER"/>
...
<switch name="switchCCTypeFlag">
<case> <condition>
$e_inviteEventCreatorRequest.payload = ’true’ &...
</condition>
<assign name="assignEventCreatorRequest"><copy>
<from expression="$e_inviteECRequest.payload= ’false’"/>
<to variable="p_inviteECReplay" part="payload"/>
</copy></assign>
...
<flow>
<reply partner="EC" operation="ReplayEventCreation"
variable="p\_enter1ECReplay"/>
...
</flow>
</case>
<otherwise>
<condition>$e_enterECRequest.payload= ’true’
& ...</condition>
<assign name="assignECRequest">
<copy><from expression="$e_enterECRequest.payload = ’false’"/>
<to variable="p_enterECReplay" part="payload"/>
</copy></assign>
...
<flow>
<reply partner="EC" operation="ReplayEC"
variable="p_enter1ECReplay"/>
...
</flow>
</otherwise>
</switch>
</flow>
reply_enter2reply_enter1 reply_enter
receive_o1 receive_o2 receive_o3
star switch
condition1 otherwise
reply_open
Assign Assign
Assign Assign Assign
Assign
reply_open1 reply_open2
start flow
OrchL
Figure 11: BPEL process generation of an orchestrator component.
using a flows to relation defined as follows:
L1 ⊑ L2 ≡ ∀o1 ∈ O(L1). ∀o2 ∈ O(L2). o1 ≺ o2 ∧
∀r1 ∈ R(L1, o1). ∃r2 ∈ R(L2, o2). r1 ≺ r2
The intuition behind the flows to relation ⊑ above is that (1) the information
can only flow from one owner o1 to either the same or a more powerful owner
o2 where o2 can act for o1 and (2) the readers allowed by R(L2, o) must be a
subset of the readers allowed by R(L1, o) where we consider that the readers
allowed by a policy include not only the principals explicitly mentioned but also
the principals able to act for them.
In our setting for BPEL WS, the principals used to define the acts for rela-
tion and the security domain are obtained from BPEL partner-links that corre-
spond to WS URI. That is, principals can be either BPEL processes or atomic
WS in some primitive language. The designer expresses his security policy by
tagging BPEL variables in each process using DLM labels. The security domain
and these annotations are then transposed as such on atomic components.
5.3. Abstract Model Configuration
Additionally to the system functional model, security annotation is provided
in a configuration file (Annotations.xml) that contains the acts for relations and
labels to different ports and data in each atomic component. Figure 12 present
the configuration file for the Whens App abstract model. We extend the system
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model parser to extract labels from Annotations.xml file and we associate them
to their corresponding ports and data types in the secureBIP model. Next, the
secureBIP checker tool browses all atomic components and interactions in the
model to extract events dependencies at each local state (incoming and outgo-
ing port labelled transitions) and data dependencies at different transition’s and
interaction’s actions and checks their label consistency. In the case where tool
verdict is positive, the tool generates automatically an interaction partition file
that describes the set of interactions that each orchestrator component would
manage. This file is used as input by secureBIP2Dist to generate an annotated
S/R model. The secureBIP2Dist generator is modified to encompass modi-
fications in decentralized model as well as rules for annotations propagation.
<config>
<acts for><authority> EC:ER1,ER2; </authority></acts for>
<var config>
<variable name=”s” component=”EC” label=”EC:ER1,ER2”>
<variable name=”r1” component=”ER1” label=”EC:ER1,ER2”>
<variable name=”r2” component=”ER2” label=”EC:ER1,ER2”>
...
</var config>
<port config>
<port name=”invite” component=”EC” label=” : ”>
<port name=”open” component=”ER1” label=” : ”>
<port name=”store” component=”EC” label=”EC:ER1,ER2”>
...
</port config>
</config>
Figure 12: Platform independent configuration
5.4. Platform-Dependent Configuration
Here the system designer provides configuration file that maps security-
policies to be used to ensure confidentiality and integrity for data and ports
to secure interactions between atomic S/R and orchestrator components. To
preserve confidentiality, we use encryption and for integrity we use digital sig-
nature. We assume that the generated code is running on trusted hosts where
it is safe to generate and store encryption keys. Security Library contains dif-
ferent tokens for encryption protocols and functions that, following the policy-
configuration file (policy-cfg.xml), the code generator selects messages to secure
at communications.
<platform config>
<security level=”EC:ER1,ER2”><encryption name=”rsa encrypt 2048”/>
<signature token=”X.509”/></security>
<security level=” : ”><encryption name=””/>
<signature token=””/></security>
</platform config>
Figure 13: Platform dependent configuration
Each component in the abstract model corresponds to a BPEL process that
interprets its behavior. The configuration states the encryption and signature
mechanisms for each defined security level, that is, for variables and ports that
need to be secured following the secure abstract annotations. When only the
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variable in the process is configured to be confidential and it is transiting in
a low level security channel, encryption and signature is only applied to the
value of the variable before sending it (which corresponds to the payload of the
message). However, when the interaction (channel) connecting two high level
security ports, the hole connection is considered to be confidential and a session
should be created where we enforce message privacy (not only the payload of a
message should be encrypted and even header where the sender and receiver of
messages are hidden).
To ensure this, we mainly relied on the use of Oracle Web Service Man-
ager (OWSM) to ensure the security of generated BPEL orchestrator. Encryp-
tion/decryption mechanisms (function, libraries and services) are implemented
using WS-security tokens. A selected security mechanism is invoked if the vari-
able that we intend to send belongs to a specific sensitive domain. The payload
of a message is encrypted and then sent back to the destination service. For
integrity sake, security tokens signing messages are added as ws-security poli-
cies in the WSDL file describing the service and are checked at each message
send and receive. Authentication mechanisms and session encryption are also
introduced in WSDL file when the used ports are configured to be secured.
5.5. Discussion and Experiments
Here we introduce configuration according to the propagated annotation in
the distributed model using the configuration file where we specify authentica-
tion and encryption mechanisms. The executions is performed on an Intel Code
2Duo 2GHz with 4GB RAM memory running Linux Ubuntu. For generation of
the certificates for signature and encryption, we use X.509 WS-security tokens
with an asymmetric encryption algorithm (RSA) with 2048bit key size.
As an Evaluation of our approach performance, we consider three execution
scenarios:
• P1: we consider a set of 100 S/R components within two orchestrator
components, communicating between each other with a defined set of in-
teractions.
• P2: we consider set of 10 S/R components within two orchestrator com-
ponent, communicating with the same number of interactions as P1.
• P3: we consider the same set of interactions as P1 and P2 handled with
four orchestrator components (two for each level), assuring communication
between a set of 10 S/R components.
The experiments are run to calculate execution time for all system scenar-
ios, first without introducing security mechanisms on interactions and then after
adding them. From Figure 14, we can see that the architecture of the system
model have no significant effect on the execution time of the model where exe-
cuting the same binding set between components do not introduce a significant
overhead. The use of cryptographic mechanisms induces an average overhead of
20%, however this performance can be improved if we choose to use, for instance,
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Figure 14: Execution time with different scenarios for the When App application.
symmetric encryption instead of the asymmetric one currently implemented. In
scenario P3, rising the number of orchestrator components allows more concur-
rency to execute components and interactions which reduces the execution time
of the system.
There exists diverse authentication and encryption mechanisms used to sign
messages by including the corresponding tokens into the security header of the
message and encode them. The choice between simple tokens (User-name/Clear
Password, User-name/Password Digest), Binary Tokens (X.509 certificates, Ker-
beros) or XML Tokens (SAML assertions, XrML (eXtensible Rights Markup
Language), XCBF (XML Common Biometric Format)) for signature and en-
cryption algorithms is depending on the application context and the required
quality of service.
We also emphasize that several works on model-based security aim at sim-
plifying security configuration and coding [24, 25]. In [25], authors, propose
modeling security policy in UML and target automating security code genera-
tion for business applications like JEE and .net applications. Other works [24]
use model-based approach to simplify secure code deployment on heterogeneous
platforms. Compared to these, our work is not restricted to point-to-point access
control and deals with information flow security. If we consider the Whens App
application, it is not clear how these tools can manage multiparty interactions
while preserving information and participants privacy. Recent works on infor-
mation flow security in web services, rely on Petri-nets for modeling composed
services [26]. First, Petri-net graphs are generated from BPEL orchestration
processes and are, next, modified by the developer to represent shared resources
and to annotate interactions. Developers modification is necessary here since
Petri-nets capture event-based interactions only. Our model allows representing
both data and events.
6. Related Work
BPEL decentralisation is to decompose a BPEL process into several sub-
processes, each deployed and executed by a different orchestrator. To do this, in
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[27], authors propose to use techniques for analyzing and re-scheduling nodes to
minimize the communication load in case several instances are executed at the
same time using workflow dependency graphs. The same work is extended to
discuss different aspects of decentralization such as synchronization problems in
the case of decentralized execution, or the implementation of restrictions on the
flow of data between translated fragments. More recently, Lifeng et al. [28] pro-
posed an extension of this approach to decentralization of BPEL processes. This
extension concerns the optimization of the partitioning process using a genetic
algorithm. First they create an initial partitioning topology, then they apply
transformations using genetic operators (selection, crossing and mutation) on
this solution. Then, they evaluate the new solution and reiterate until reaching
a threshold on the number of iterations. The partitioning chosen is the one
that has a better quality (using an evaluation function: adaptation function).
However, these two approaches do not provide a generic partitioning method-
ology independent of the composition language, nor consider the distribution
constraints (collocate and separate). Hence, the designer has no control over
the decentralization process. In [29, 30], Yildiz et al. Consider the decentraliza-
tion process in an abstract way and extend the deadline elimination algorithm
used by the BPEL process execution engines. Their contribution seeks to pre-
serve the constraints of the control flow of the centralized specification, and to
prevent a deadlock in interactions between services. Most of the techniques de-
veloped address particular aspects of decentralization, rather than providing a
generic and flexible methodology. The major disadvantage of these approaches
is their dependencies of the specification language. In our work, we propose a
secure-by-construction approach that handles a decentralized orchestration of
complex systems with multi-party interactions. This approach is automated,
language independent and practical which takes also handles information flow
security.
Model-based security aims at simplifying security configuration and cod-
ing. The work in [25] considers modelling security policies in UML and targets
automating security code generation for business applications using JEE and
.net. The work of [24] uses a model-based approach to simplify secure code
deployment on heterogeneous platforms. Compared to these, our work is not
restricted to point-to-point access control and deals with information flow se-
curity. The work on designing web services from [31] relies on Petri-nets for
modelling composed services and annotations for the flow of interactions. Our
component model is more general and deals with both data and event- non-
interference.
Information flow control for programming languages dates back to
Denning who originally proposed a language for static information flow checking
[32]. Since then, information-flow control based on type systems and associated
compilation tools has widely developed [33, 34, 35]. Recently, it extends to
provably-secure languages including cryptographic functions[36, 37, 38, 39, 40].
With few exceptions, all these approaches are restricted to sequential imperative
languages and ignore distribution/communication aspects. Among the excep-
tions, JifSplit [41] takes as input a security-annotated program, and splits it
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into threads by assuming that the communication through the network is se-
cure. Furthermore, in [42] the communication’s security is enforced by adding
cryptographic mechanisms. The drawback of these is that the security aspect
guides the system distribution. In practice, a separation of concerns is required
and the system architecture must be independent of security constraints. Our
approach is different since our starting point is a component-based model and
the security constraints are expressed with annotations at the architecture level.
Operating systems like Flume [43], HiStar [44] and Asbestos [45] ensure
information flow control between processes by associating security labels to pro-
cesses and messages. DStar [46] extends HiStar to distributed applications.
These approaches may appear attractive since transparent to the developer.
Nevertheless, the granularity of processes may be too coarse to establish end-
to-end security for distributed applications with complex interactions.
Component-based design is appealing for verification of security since
the system structure and communications are explicitly represented. However,
existing work focus merely on point-yo-point access control. The work of [47]
considers dependencies between service components but not advanced properties
like implicit information flow. In [48], authors provide APIs to configure the
security of component connectors. The work in [49] deals with non-interference
on component-based models using annotation propagation inside component
code. In our work, we achieve complete separation between the abstract high-
level component model on which non-interference is verified, and the low-level
platform-dependent model where security is enforced by construction.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
We introduced a tool-supported approach to automatically orchestrate and
secure information flow in composed WS. By abstracting the system behavior
to a component-based model with multi-party interactions, we verify security
policy preservation, that is, non-interference property at both event and data
levels. Then, we generate a distributed model where multi-party interactions
are replaced with protocols based on the use message passing. The distributed
model is proved ”secure-by-construction”. As a target for the S/R distributed
model, we generate a set of orchestrated BPEL processes that relying on web
services security standards, ensure the required protection of the information
flow. On longer term, we plan to extend both the security model and the
associated transformations for relaxed versions of non-interference i.e, allowing
runtime re-labelling, declassification, intransitive.
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